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Abstract 
Selective attention toward threatening facial expressions has been found to precipitate and 
maintain symptoms of social anxiety. However, the automaticity of this bias is under debate. 
In the present study, we aimed to test whether top-down (controlled) engagement and 
disengagement of attention toward threatening faces is associated with social anxiety. This 
was examined by testing the impact of a secondary working memory (WM) load on 
attentional biases. In a variation of the dot-probe task, participants’ attention was initially 
cued to the left or right of fixation before an upright face paired with an inverted face was 
presented (displaying a disgust or neutral expression), and participants responded to a 
subsequently presented probe. The task was performed under no-load, low-load (one-digit 
memory task), and high-load (six-digit memory task) conditions. Social anxiety was not 
found to be associated with delayed disengagement from threat. However, surprisingly, high 
social anxiety was associated with an engagement bias away from threat, whereas low social 
anxiety was associated with a bias toward threat. These results were unaffected by the WM 
load manipulation. This indicates that engagement with threatening facial expressions has 
minimal contributions from top-down mechanisms, since it is likely that orienting to facial 
expressions occurs relatively automatically.  
 
 
 
Keywords: selective attention, spatial attention, working memory load, social anxiety, dot-
probe.  
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Social anxiety and attentional biases: A top-down contribution? 
When interacting with our environment, we are bombarded with visual information, 
only a small amount of which can be consciously processed due to our limited perceptual 
resources (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kastner & Pinsk, 2004). Selective attention is, 
therefore, used to filter information so that the visual system can preferentially attend to 
important and relevant aspects of the visual environment. Consequently, selective attention is 
integral in shaping our perception of the world around us. One factor that exerts a powerful 
influence over selective attention is an individual’s level of anxiety. For example, although 
healthy individuals may show a small bias for preferentially processing threatening stimuli 
(e.g., feared objects such as snakes) over neutral stimuli, this bias is heightened for 
individuals with anxiety. Indeed, this threat bias is viewed as a core cognitive component of 
anxiety and central to many contemporary conceptualisations of clinical anxiety disorders 
and their treatments (Cisler & Koster, 2010). For example, some longitudinal studies suggest 
that threat biases in childhood predict the development of anxiety disorders later in life 
(Shechner et al., 2012). Furthermore, threat biases are involved in the maintenance of anxiety, 
since attentional training to reduce threat biases also reduces anxiety (for a review, see Bar-
Haim, 2010).  
Given the sensitivity of socially anxious individuals to negative social evaluation, 
threatening facial expressions hold special clinical significance for this population (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). According to Rapee and Heimberg’s cognitive model, individuals with 
social anxiety are hypervigilant to monitoring their external environment for signs of negative 
evaluation from others. For example, when giving a speech, a socially anxious individual will 
be more likely to scan their audience for facial signs of criticism or disapproval (e.g., 
frowning), which then increases their level of anxiety. This model is supported by research 
findings that socially anxious individuals show biased attention toward photos depicting 
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angry, hostile, and disgust expressions compared with neutral facial expressions (Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004).  
In the present study, we aimed to test whether these threat biases are driven by 
bottom-up or top-down attention. Top-down attention refers to the voluntary allocation of 
attention toward particular objects, features, or spatial locations based on one’s current goals. 
For example, when looking for a friend in a crowd, knowing that the friend is wearing a red 
scarf allows one to selectively attend to red objects. By contrast, bottom-up attention is an 
involuntary, rapid, and inflexible process that selects visual information based on the salience 
of the stimulus features. For example, while searching for a red object, an individual’s 
attention may be captured by a flashing billboard even though the person had no intention to 
attend to that stimulus.  
Traditionally, threat biases have been conceptualised as bottom-up. In line with this 
notion, evolutionary models posit that being able to respond to threat through bottom-up 
processing is adaptive (Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller, 2010; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; LeDoux, 1996; LoBue, Rakison, & DeLoache, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Ohman, 2007). That is, being able to detect a threatening stimulus in the 
environment has evolved in the human species to facilitate survival (e.g., a fight or flight 
response to a predator) and is part of an automatic vigilance mechanism (Pratto & John, 
1991). In support of this argument, research has shown that humans can engage early and 
rapid detection of low-level perceptual features associated with threatening images (LoBue, 
2014; LoBue & DeLoache, 2011; LoBue & Larson, 2010). For example, using a visual search 
task, LoBue (2014) observed a bias toward curvilinear shapes (representative of snakes) 
compared with rectangular shapes. In addition, this bias to curvilinear shapes increases after 
watching a fearful film clip (LoBue, 2014), indicating that anxiety increases the detection of 
threat-relevant, low-level perceptual features. Similarly, biases for angry face features, such 
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as the downward “V” shape of the eyebrows, have been found in both child and adult 
populations, which these authors argue indicates an evolved attentional bias for threatening 
stimuli (LoBue & Larson, 2010).  
However, in opposition to this argument, research has found that threat detection does 
not always occur automatically. Visual search requires participants to detect an object or 
feature as rapidly as possible amongst distractor objects in a visual array. Using this task, past 
research has found that socially anxious individuals detect angry faces among neutral 
distractors more rapidly than happy faces among neutral distractors (Gilboa-Schechtman, 
Foa, & Amir, 1999). However, search times have been found to increase with added 
distractors (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Since 
automaticity in visual search has traditionally been conceptualised as being invariant to the 
number of distractors in the display (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), this suggests that the 
processing of threatening faces is not purely bottom-up as it requires attentional resources 
(Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Vuilleumier & Righart, 2011).  
The involvement of attentional resources in this process of orienting toward threat can 
be assessed with the use of working memory (WM) load. Previous research has found that 
tasks with high WM loads result in greater interference effects from visual distractors 
compared with low WM load tasks (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001). Thus, voluntary, 
top-down selective attention can be impaired by WM load. By contrast, bottom-up attention 
is unaffected by WM load (e.g., Jonides, 1981). In the present study, therefore, we imposed a 
WM load to selectively impair the top-down attentional system without impacting bottom-up 
mechanisms.  
Researchers employing WM load tasks have found some evidence that attentional 
biases can be overcome under high WM load (Pessoa et al., 2002; Van Dillen & Koole, 
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2009). For instance, Van Dillen and Koole employed an interference paradigm, in which 
participants viewed faces of varying expressions and were asked to indicate the gender of the 
faces. This study found that, as compared with happy faces, angry faces resulted in slower 
gender naming, but only under low-load. These researchers propose that, under high-load, 
negative stimuli do not capture attention because WM is fully engaged by the task. Only 
under low-load, when there are spare attentional resources, can negative stimuli are 
prioritised. However, this body of research has looked at interference effects from threatening 
stimuli that are presented individually at an attended location, rather than the capture of 
attention to the spatial location of a stimulus that is in competition with other stimuli 
elsewhere in the scene. Spatial attentional capture is particularly important to understanding 
threat biases for socially anxious individuals as they may cause individuals, when giving a 
speech for example, to attend to threatening faces in a top-down fashion, thus increasing their 
anxiety.  
Recently, Judah, Grant, Lechner, and Mills (2013) assessed the top-down nature of 
the threat bias with socially anxious individuals by presenting participants with images of 
happy, disgust, and neutral facial expressions in a dot-probe task under three conditions: no, 
low, and high WM load. In the modified dot-probe task, two faces (e.g., one neutral and one 
negative) are presented on the computer screen, one to the left and one to the right of fixation. 
A probe (e.g., a letter) is then presented in the locus of one of the faces and participants are 
asked to respond to its identity. Faster reaction times (RTs) to respond to a probe appearing in 
the locus of a negative facial expression compared to a probe in the locus of a neutral facial 
expression indicates that participants’ attention was captured by the negative face. This is 
known as a threat bias.    
Judah et al. (2013) used a long presentation time for the faces (1000ms), which they 
claimed measured later attentional mechanisms of disengagement and avoidance. These 
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researchers found that socially anxious individuals displayed avoidance of disgust 
expressions under no WM load but had difficulty disengaging attention under high WM load. 
However, one issue with this study, and that of the dot-probe design more generally, is that 
engagement and disengagement biases are conflated. Therefore, a threat bias can arise either 
due to enhanced engagement with that face or delayed disengagement from it. Although 
Judah et al. (2013) claimed that disengagement biases can be assessed using a long 
presentation time, this assumes that all participants initially shift their attention equally 
toward the threatening stimulus. If, however, individuals with higher levels of socially 
anxiety more readily engage with the threatening face, any attempt to measure the 
disengagement bias is conflated with engagement effects. Due to this issue, it cannot be 
determined whether the finding that social anxiety is linked to a threat bias is due to enhanced 
engagement or delayed disengagement effects.   
Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky, Basanovic, and MacLeod (2014) have 
developed an elegant method for differentiating engagement biases from disengagement 
biases using a variation of the dot-probe task. In this design, on each trial participants viewed 
a target image (a threatening or neutral scene) paired with a non-representational image 
(abstract art) and participants’ shifts of attention toward and away from the location of the 
target image was measured. Specifically, these researchers presented an initial cue (a small 
red line oriented horizontally or vertically) before the presentation of the faces. This cue was 
presented either on the left or right side of the screen and, therefore, secured participants’ 
attention in the same location or opposite location to the target image. A disengagement trial 
was defined as a trial in which the target image was presented in the same location as the 
preceding cue, as participants were required to disengage their attention from the target to 
respond to a subsequent probe in the distal location. An engagement trial, by contrast, was 
defined as a trial in which the target was presented in the opposite location to the preceding 
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cue, as these trials measured whether participants shifted their attention toward the target. 
After the cue and faces were presented, a probe (similar in appearance to the cue) was 
presented in the locus of one of the faces and participants were asked to indicate whether the 
probe was the same or a different orientation to the cue. On 50% of trials, the probe appeared 
in the distal location to the target face and on 50% of trials, it appeared in the proximal 
location. Therefore, for engagement trials, faster RTs in the proximal probe position 
compared with the distal position, indicated that participants shifted their attention toward the 
target face. Importantly, these distal-proximal probe difference scores were compared 
between trials in which the target image was negative compared with when it was neutral, to 
measure if greater engagement toward threat occurred for anxious participants. Similarly, 
difference scores were used to measure the disengagement bias to test whether participants 
had greater difficulty shifting away from the target image and responding to the distally 
presented probe, compared with the proximal probe, when a negative target image was used 
compared with a neutral target image. Both Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. 
(2014) found that high trait anxious participants, compared with low trait anxious 
participants, have engagement biases and delayed disengagement biases for threat. 
Although it was published after data collection for the present study was complete, a 
recent study employed a similar design to measure engagement and disengagement biases for 
participants with low and high social anxiety (Grafton & MacLeod, 2016). On each trial, 
negative and neutral faces were paired together and these researchers found that participants 
with high social anxiety had a greater engagement bias toward negative facial expressions 
compared with participants with low social anxiety. Social anxiety was not found to be 
associated with difficulties disengaging from threat. These data indicate the importance, 
therefore, of differentiating these biases from one another. The present study will extend on 
Grafton and MacLeod’s research by testing whether these biases are driven by top-down or 
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bottom-up attentional orienting (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner, 1980). Specifically, the 
present study includes an additional WM load task to test if attentional biases are affected by 
high WM load, which would indicate that they are driven by top-down attention. 
Present Experiment 
In the present study, we sought to investigate the contribution of top-down attention in 
the selective processing of threatening visual information for individuals with high social 
anxiety. This was tested using a variation of the dot-probe task (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; 
Rudaizky et al., 2014), in which participants were presented with neutral and disgust facial 
expressions and their engagement with and ability to disengage from these faces were 
measured. The dot-probe task provides an opportunity to measure spatial attention, which is 
of particular clinical relevance to social anxiety and also allows for the separate analysis of 
engagement and disengagement biases. Engagement and disengagement biases were 
compared under three conditions: no WM load, low WM load, and high WM load. WM load 
was used to deplete top-down attentional resources. Under no and low WM load, it was 
expected that higher social anxiety would be associated with an engagement bias toward the 
disgust faces. If the engagement bias is driven by bottom-up attention, this bias would be 
unaffected by the load manipulation. However, if the engagement bias is driven by top-down 
attention, this bias would be attenuated under high WM load. Regarding disengagement 
effects, recent research has found that social anxiety is not associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat (Grafton & MacLeod, 2016). However, trait anxiety, which shares 
many similar features with social anxiety, has been found to be associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). With this 
study, therefore, we aimed to elucidate whether social anxiety is associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat and, if it is, whether it is affected by WM load. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred participants (53 female) were recruited from the Australian National 
University via online advertisement and the university electronic sign-up system and these 
participants completed the experiment in exchange for course credit or $30 payment. 
Participants all reported to have normal or corrected vision, their ages ranged from 17 to 36 
years (M=22.43, SD=3.62) and 91 of them were right-handed. Participants’ social anxiety 
scores, as measured by the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1989) 
ranged from 3 to 64 (M=26.18, SD=12.94). These scores are somewhat higher than would be 
expected based on the normative data of Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, and Liebowitz 
(1992), who found a mean of 19.9 on the SIAS in a community sample. Heimberg et al. 
(1992) defined the clinical cut-off for social phobia as equal to or greater than 34 on the 
SIAS, which reflected one SD above the mean score of the community sample.  
Participants’ depression scores on the depression component of the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) ranged from 0 to 39 (M=5.69, 
SD=5.79) and, as measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), state anxiety ranged from 20 to 62 (M=33.7, SD=9.21) and 
trait anxiety ranged from 24 to 72 (M=42.55, SD=9.06). All participants provided written 
informed consent prior to participation and provided demographic information. Table 1 
presents demographic and self-report scores for participants with low and high social anxiety, 
as calculated using a median split.  
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Table 1 
Demographic and self-report scores for low and high social anxiety groups 
 Participants 
(Female) 
Age 
M(SD) 
SIAS 
M(SD) 
DASS-D 
M(SD) 
STAI-S 
M(SD) 
STAI-T 
M(SD) 
Low social 
anxiety 
50 (26) 22.26 
(3.39) 
15.72 
(5.65) 
3.66 
(3.86) 
30.10 
(7.00) 
36.54 
(7.47) 
High social 
anxiety 
50 (27) 22.40 
(3.66) 
36.64 
(9.10) 
7.72 
(6.67) 
37.30 
(9.79) 
46.56 
(8.79) 
Images 
Images of faces was taken from the FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, & 
Lindenberger, 2010), consisting of the neutral and disgust expressions from Set A of the 
young age range (ages 19-31). Since research has found a same-age facial recognition bias 
(Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012), the young age range faces were included in this study to match 
the average age of participants. On each trial the two faces presented were taken from the 
same face model so that they were matched for facial properties, and one image was 
presented upright and one image was inverted. Each image subtended 6.81 x 8.52° of visual 
angle. 
Experimental Task 
Participants completed the demographic questions, the SIAS, STAI, and depression 
items from the DASS, and then participated in the computer task. This experiment was 
conducted in a dimly lit room. Stimuli were presented on a cathode-ray tube (CRT) gamma-
corrected monitor running at a 75Hz refresh rate. Viewing distance was set with a chinrest at 
44cm. Stimuli were programed in Matlab using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) 
and the background was set to black.  
The computer task consisted of three blocks of trials (no-load, low-load, and high-
load) counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of 224 trials and so each 
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participant completed a total of 672 trials. Before each block, participants completed five 
practice trials with corrective feedback. 
In the low- and high-load conditions, a number was presented centrally on the screen 
at the beginning and end of each trial (see Figure 1). A single-digit number was used in the 
low-load condition and a six-digit number was used in the high-load condition. The digits in 
these numbers could range between 1 and 9 and were generated using a random number 
generator. On approximately half the trials the number presented at the end of the trial 
matched the one presented at the beginning and on approximately half of the trials it changed. 
In the high-load condition, the number could only change by one of the digits so the 
participant was required to remember all six digits to determine if it was the same or 
different. For the low-load task, the single-digit number was presented for 1000ms, whereas 
in the high-load task, the six-digit number was presented for 3000ms, which provided 
sufficient time to read the number strings. Participants were then asked to make a 
same/different keyboard press to indicate whether it matched the number presented at the 
beginning of the trial.  
Regarding the main probe task, initially a blank screen was presented for 1000ms. On 
each trial two white rectangular outlines were initially presented, one to the left and one to 
the right of fixation for 1000ms. These rectangular outlines subtended 6.81 x 8.52° of visual 
angle and the width of the lines subtended 0.089°. A smaller red rectangle, subtending 1.70 x 
2.13°, was also presented inside one of the white rectangles to indicate the location of the to-
be-presented cue. The cue (a small red line) was then presented within the box for 200ms. 
This cue could be oriented horizontally or vertically and subtended a visual angle of 0.48° 
and had a width of 0.089°. 
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After these stimuli disappeared, two images of faces were presented for 500ms, one to 
the left and one to the right of fixation, such that they occupied the locations that the white 
rectangles previously occupied. After these faces offset, a probe (a small red line) oriented 
horizontally or vertically, which was identical in appearance to the cue, was then presented in 
the locus of one of the faces and was oriented horizontally or vertically. Participants made a 
keyboard press to report whether the orientation of the probe matched the orientation of the 
cue as quickly and accurately as possible. The variables (location, orientation, and image 
type) were randomised, with the restriction that an equal number of trials consisted of 
disengagement or engagement trials, negative or neutral upright photos, and that the probe 
was distal or proximal to the upright image 
 
Figure 1. A schematic of an engagement trial under high-load.  
An engagement trial was defined as a trial in which the upright face was presented in 
the opposite location of the preceding cue (for a discussion, see Rudaizky et al., 2014). This 
is because these trials measure the likelihood that participants will shift their attention toward 
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the upright face. By contrast, for disengagement trials, the upright face was presented in the 
same location as the preceding cue. Therefore, participants were required to disengage their 
attention from the upright face to respond to a subsequent probe in the distal location.  
Calculation of bias indices. In accordance with the method developed by Grafton and 
MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. (2014), engagement bias and disengagement bias 
indices were calculated. Higher scores for the attentional engagement bias index reflects 
facilitated attentional orienting toward the disgust expression compared with the neutral 
expression. The equation is as follows: 
 
Engagement bias index = (Cue probe distal to upright negative image in upright 
negative/inverted image pair: RT for target probes distal to upright negative image 
minus RT for target probes proximal to upright negative image) minus (Cue probe 
distal to neutral upright image in neutral upright/inverted image pair: RT for target 
probes distal to upright neutral image minus RT for target probes proximal to upright 
neutral image). 
 
Similarly, higher scores for the attentional disengagement bias index reflects greater 
difficulty disengaging from the disgust expression compared with the neutral expression. The 
equation is as follows: 
Disengagement bias index = (Cue probe proximal to upright negative image in 
upright negative/inverted image pair: RT for target probe distal to upright negative 
image minus RT for target probe proximal to upright negative image) minus (Cue 
probe proximal to upright neutral image in upright neutral/inverted image pair: RT for 
target probe distal to upright neutral image minus RT for target probe proximal to 
upright neutral image). 
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Results 
The data from two participants were excluded due to technical failure. A further 
participants’ data were excluded due to responding quicker than 100ms throughout the 
experiment, indicating random responding. Finally, three participants’ data were excluded as 
their overall RTs were slower than 3.29 SDs from average. Therefore, 94 participants’ data 
were included in further statistical analyses.  
The mean accuracies on the probe task was 94.96% (SD=3.47) in the no-load 
condition, 96.89% (SD=2.72) in the low-load condition, and 96.08% (SD=2.83) in the high-
load condition. The mean accuracy on the digit-span task was significantly (t(93)=7.10, 
p<.001) higher in the low-load condition (M=94.56%, SD=4.17) compared with the high-load 
condition (M=89.94%, SD=7.79) indicating that, as expected, the six-digit task was more 
difficult than the one-digit task. 
Data from trials in which participants performed incorrectly on the probe task were 
excluded from analyses because this indicates that participants were not attending in the 
correct location at the beginning of the trial. In addition, in the low- and high-load conditions, 
trials in which participants responded incorrectly on the digit task were excluded as the load 
manipulation may not have been successful on these trials. Further exclusions were made for 
trials in which RTs were less than 100ms or greater than 2.5 standard deviations above the 
individual participant’s mean RT. Each participants’ mean performance was then calculated 
for each condition. The average percentage of excluded trials was 7.60% for the no-load 
condition, 13.26% for the low-load condition, and 18.20% for the high-load condition.  
Engagement Bias  
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Since the construct of social fear is a continuous variable in the population (McNeil, 
2010), social anxiety was analysed as continuous in this study. Furthermore, since 
engagement and disengagement biases are separate attentional processes (Grafton & 
MacLeod, 2014), they were analysed separately. Using the engagement bias index equation, 
each participant’s engagement bias was calculated. To analyse the engagement bias, a 
repeated-measures ANCOVA was performed with the within-subject factor of load (no, low, 
and high) and the continuous variable of social anxiety. Mauchley’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for load (χ2(2)=15.53, p<.001) and, therefore, 
degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = 
.86).  
Load was not found to be significant (F(1.73, 91)=.85, p=.416, ηp2=.009), which 
indicates that the engagement bias index did not alter across the no-load, low-load, and high-
load conditions. In addition, the interaction between load and social anxiety was not 
significant (F(1.73, 91)=.64, p=.507, ηp2=.007). However, a significant trend effect was found 
for the relationship between social anxiety level and the engagement bias index (F(1, 
92)=3.12, p=.081, ηp2=.033). Scatterplots revealed that, surprisingly, the engagement bias 
index decreased with increasing levels of social anxiety. To quantify the effect, a median 
split was conducted to compare participants with low versus high social anxiety. Participants 
with low social anxiety had a mean engagement bias index of 4.97ms and participants with 
high social anxiety had a mean engagement bias index of -6.61ms. This indicates that low 
social anxiety was associated with a slight bias toward disgust expressions and high social 
anxiety was associated with a slight bias away from disgust expressions. Raw data are 
presented in Appendix A. 
Post-hoc exploratory analyses. Due to past research indicating that people rapidly 
habituate to threatening images (Breiter et al., 1996; Staugaard, 2009), it was hypothesised 
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that the threat bias may have diminished over the course of the experiment. To further 
elucidate the trend engagement effect found in the previous analysis, the data from 
participants’ first block (224 trials) of data were analysed. An ANCOVA was performed with 
the between-subjects factor of load (no, low, and high) and the continuous predictor variable 
of social anxiety. The main effect of load was not significant (F(2, 90)=1.51, p=.227, 
ηp2=.032), confirming that load did not impact engagement toward disgust expressions. 
However the impact of social anxiety on the engagement bias index was significant (F(1, 
90)=4.66, p=.034, ηp2=.049). Similar to the overall analysis, observation of scatterplots (see 
Figure 2) indicated that the engagement bias index decreased with higher levels of social 
anxiety. In addition, a median split indicated that participants with low social anxiety had an 
engagement bias index of 10.26ms, which suggests that they had a bias toward threat, and 
participants with high social anxiety had an engagement bias index of -10.50ms, indicating a 
bias away from threat. Raw data are presented are Appendix B. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between social anxiety and attentional engagement toward threat.  
Disengagement Bias  
 To analyse the disengagement bias index, a repeated-measures ANCOVA was 
performed with the within-subject factor of load (no, low, and high) and the continuous 
predictor variable of social anxiety. Load was not significant (F(2, 91)=.03, p=.975, 
ηp2≤.001), which indicates that the disengagement bias index did not alter across the no-load, 
low-load, and high-load conditions. In addition, no significant effects were found for social 
anxiety level (F(2, 91)=.283, p=.596, ηp2=.003) or the interaction between load and social 
anxiety (F(2, 91)=.95, p=.387, ηp2=.010). This indicates that social anxiety was not associated 
with difficulty disengaging from disgust facial expressions.  
 A sidenote on these results was that, unexpectedly, participants were faster to respond 
to a probe presented in the distal location (M=698ms) compared with the proximal location 
(M=717ms) of the upright image (F(1, 92)=6.06, p=.016, ηp2=.062). This suggests that 
participants had already disengaged from the upright image, both for neutral and disgust 
expressions, when the probe appeared. The implications of this are addressed in the 
discussion. 
Discussion 
Despite the proliferation of research exploring attentional biases, the differential roles 
of bottom-up and top-down attentional mechanisms remain unclear. Using a variation of the 
dot-probe task, the present project aimed to test whether engagement and disengagement 
biases toward negative facial expressions for individuals with higher levels of social anxiety 
are driven by top-down attention. Specifically, the present project employed a WM load task 
to manipulate the availability of top-down attentional resources to test if this impacted 
attentional biases toward threat. 
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Do Socially Anxious Individuals have an Engagement Bias toward Threat? 
 Surprisingly this study did not find any evidence that individuals with higher social 
anxiety have an engagement bias toward disgust expressions compared with neutral 
expressions. In fact, the study found the opposite effect. Although only significant at trend 
levels (p =.081), the present study found that increasing levels of social anxiety was 
associated with a decreased engagement bias. In fact, individuals with high social anxiety 
were faster to respond to probes following neutral expressions compared with the disgust 
expressions, indicating a bias away from threat.  
We hypothesised that the effects may have become diluted over the course of the 
experiment due to habituation to threat. The present study included 224 trials per load 
condition, which totalled 672 trials per participant. Past research indicates that participants 
rapidly habituate to emotional faces in the dot-probe task (Staugaard, 2009), which may have 
accounted for the small effect that was found. To explore this possibility, each participants’ 
first block of trials (totalling 224 trials) were analysed separately. The trend that was found in 
the previous analysis was now significant (p=.034), indicating that participants with lower 
levels of social anxiety had an engagement bias toward the disgust expressions and 
participants with high social anxiety had a bias away from the disgust expressions.  
These results differ from Grafton and MacLeod’s (2016) study, which found that 
socially anxious individuals had an engagement bias toward negative facial expressions. This 
is surprising as these two studies aimed to measure the same attentional processes. However, 
there are some differences in the experimental design, which may account for these opposing 
results. In Grafton and MacLeod’s (2016) study, they paired negative and neutral faces 
together on each trial. By contrast, the present study was more similar to the design employed 
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by Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. (2014) who presented the neutral and 
negative images on separate trials. However, whereas Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and 
Rudaizky et al. (2014) paired the threat and neutral scenes with an abstract image on each 
trial, the present study paired negative and neutral faces with their inverted face counterpart 
to control for low level visual properties that may capture attention. Any of these 
methodological differences, either individually or in concert, may be the reason for the 
contrasting pattern of results.  
The lack of threat engagement bias for high socially anxious individuals found in this 
study reflects the complex nature of attention. For instance, past research has found enhanced 
engagement toward threat, delayed disengagement from threat, avoidance of threat, or even 
no biases at all (see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Furthermore, research has recently emerged 
suggesting that anxiety is associated with high variability in attending to threat (Zvielli, 
Bernstein, & Koster, 2015). On a dot-probe task, Zvielli et al. (2015) calculated a trial-level 
bias score by subtracting temporally contiguous pairs of congruent trials (when the probe was 
presented in the locus of a threatening image) with incongruous trials (when the probe was 
presented in the locus of a neutral image). This study found that, compared to healthy 
controls, spider phobics had greater variability in attentional capture throughout the 
experiment, sometimes displaying biases toward spider-related material and sometimes 
displaying biases away from threat. An average bias score across an experiment does not 
reveal these temporal dynamics. The current bias away from threat could, therefore, reflect 
the fact that the socially anxious participants tended to avoid the threatening faces for longer 
(more trials) after initially engaging with the threatening face.  
A second possibility is that individuals with high social anxiety were attracted to the 
threat value of the inverted face. Inverted faces were selected as the paired face to control for 
attentional capture due to low-level perceptual differences across the two presented images. 
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Furthermore, a large body of research indicates that emotion processing of faces is disrupted 
by inversion as the spatial-relations of the face are not properly processed (de Gelder, 
Teunisse, & Benson, 1997; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996). However, more recent research 
indicates that, although inverted faces are processed in a more piecemeal manner, rapid 
emotion detection can still occur (Arnold & Lipp, 2011). As described previously, the 
cognitive model of social anxiety posits that individuals with social anxiety are hypervigilant 
to monitoring their external environment for signs of negative evaluation from others (Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). In the presence of threat, it is possible that this hypervigiliance displayed 
by socially anxious individuals caused them to monitor the inverted face as well as the 
upright face. Further research is, therefore, needed to test whether the lack of engagement 
bias displayed by highly socially anxious individuals is driven by greater temporal variabiliy 
or due to the choice of inverted face as the paired image. 
Do Socially Anxious Individuals have a Disengagement Bias toward Threat? 
The present study found no evidence that socially anxious individuals have a 
disengagement bias toward disgust expressions. This is consistent with Grafton and 
MacLeod’s (2016) conclusion that social anxiety is associated with unusual engagement 
toward threat but not difficulty disengaging from threat. However, one potential issue with 
this conclusion is that the present study found faster RTs in the distal probe position 
compared with the proximal probe position. This means that on average, when the probe 
appeared, participants had already disengaged their attention from the position of the target 
face. It is possible that a briefer presentation time for the faces is needed to capture a delayed 
disengagement effect as the present study employed a presentation time of 500ms.  
A further reason to be hesitant to conclude that socially anxiety is not associated with 
delayed disengagement is that trait anxiety, which has similar theoretical underpinnings to 
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social anxiety, is associated with delayed disengagement from threat (Grafton & MacLeod, 
2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). For instance, using 500ms and 1000ms presentation times, 
Rudaizky et al. (2014) paired visual scenes (threatening or neutral) with images of abstract art 
and found that participants with high trait anxiety had a delayed disengagement bias for threat 
compared with low trait anxious participants. It is possible that participants may take longer 
to process complex visual scenes than faces, therefore, taking longer to disengage attention 
from a visual scene compared with a face. Interestingly, Grafton and MacLeod (2014), who 
utilised a similar design to Rudaizky et al. (2014), found delayed disengagement from threat 
for high trait anxious participants at 100ms stimulus durations but not 500ms stimulus 
durations. Disengagement effects, therefore, may be more robust for short stimulus 
presentation times. This indicates that, before conclusions about social anxiety and 
disengagement effects can be made, it is essential for further research to test these effects at 
durations shorter than 500ms.  
The Effect of WM Load on Engagement and Disengagement Biases 
In addition to measuring engagement and disengagement threat biases associated with 
social anxiety, the present study aimed to test whether these were driven by top-down 
attention. This study found no effect of WM load for both the engagement and 
disengagement analyses. Unfortunately, since a social anxiety related disengagement bias 
toward threat was not found, the impact of WM load on such a bias cannot be determined. 
However, although the engagement effects were unexpected, an engagement bias toward 
threat was found for low socially anxious individuals and a bias away from threat was found 
for high socially anxious individuals. These results were unaffected by the load manipulation, 
indicating that they are bottom-up. This result is in accordance with the traditional view that 
anxiety is associated with an overactive bottom-up threat detection system (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Ohman, 2007). 
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Conclusion and Implications 
 In sum, the present study indicated that social anxiety is associated with unusual 
engagement with negative facial expressions. Specifically, participants with high social 
anxiety had a slight bias away from threat and participants with low social anxiety had a bias 
toward threat. This was unaffected by WM load, which indicates that engagement with threat 
requires few attentional resources and is, therefore, largely driven by bottom-up attention. 
Social anxiety was not found to be associated with differences in disengagement from threat. 
Due to mixed findings in the literature, further research is now needed to clarify the 
conditions under which high social anxiety is associated with biases either toward or away 
from threat. In addition, as discussed previously, further research using shorter presentation 
times is needed before concluding that social anxiety is not associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat.   
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Appendix A 
Data Summary 
Data for the no-load, low-load and high-load conditions are presented in Table A1, Table A2, 
and Table A3, respectively. In addition, attentional engagement bias index and 
disengagement bias index data are presented in Table A4. Low and high social anxiety 
groups were calculated using a median split.  
Table A1 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the no-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 723.24 (140.27) 688.49 (151.48) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 696.82 (140.87) 656.02 (155.37) 
 Neutral Distal 731.97 (147.31) 692.72 (157.55) 
  Proximal 691.95 (159.26) 655.33 (173.96) 
Proximal Negative Distal 711.45 (144.62) 684.94 (163.66) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 743.72 (151.00) 700.86 (174.18) 
 Neutral Distal 696.83 (139.50) 670.15 (160.89) 
  Proximal 724.91 (159.45) 685.95 (151.10) 
 
Table A2 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the low-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 780.42 (167.80) 721.12 (175.19) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 760.50 (168.82) 712.69 (207.34) 
 Neutral Distal 786.83 (179.25) 755.62 (216.03) 
  Proximal 776.43 (193.29) 724.63 (183.32) 
Proximal Negative Distal 773.63 (181.00) 724.86 (191.63) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 792.65 (195.46) 725.72 (169.50) 
 Neutral Distal 756.25 (165.45) 720.51 (186.21) 
  Proximal 785.41 (170.95) 744.75 (184.28) 
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Table A3 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the high-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 712.25 (148.15) 649.01 (108.89) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 671.27 (144.95) 624.89 (112.56)  
 Neutral Distal 697.32 (150.32) 645.99 (108.80) 
  Proximal 675.31 (143.51) 629.50 (103.89) 
Proximal Negative Distal 680.27 (157.41) 634.69 (119.23) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 708.97 (151.39) 655.56 (118.55) 
 Neutral Distal 674.31 (134.42) 648.35 (130.86) 
  Proximal 698.97 (153.45) 642.09 (126.56) 
 
Table A4 
Means and standard deviations of attentional bias index scores for the three load conditions 
 Load condition  Engagement bias Disengagement bias 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -13.60 (94.07) -4.19 (93.60) 
 Low load 9.52 (112.44) 10.15 (80.05) 
 High load 18.98 (100.65) -4.05 (124.66) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -4.91 (76.92) -0.12 (75.77) 
 Low load -22.56 (115.26) 23.38 (90.77) 
 High load 7.63 (73.38) -27.12 (93.21) 
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Appendix B 
Data Summary: First Block of Trials 
Data for the no-load, low-load and high-load conditions for participants’ first block of trials 
(224 trials) are presented in Table B1, Table B2, and Table B3, respectively. In addition, 
attentional engagement bias index and disengagement bias index data are presented in Table 
A4. Low and high social anxiety groups were calculated using a median split.  
Table B1 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the no-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups for block one of trials 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social anxiety 
M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 710.058(134.71) 799.34 (151.82) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 702.54 (163.45) 752.71 (149.92) 
 Neutral Distal 722.72 (148.28) 809.19 (162.17) 
  Proximal 683.19 (156.20) 
 
778.05 (187.63) 
Proximal Negative Distal 722.66 (168.05) 799.73 (152.24) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 729.73 (140.94) 822.73 (203.16) 
 Neutral Distal 707.75 (162.00) 780.81 (150.22) 
  Proximal 694.61 (118.85) 785.94 (158.89) 
 
Table B2 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the low-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups for block one of trials 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social anxiety 
M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 854.28 (162.58) 725.13 (140.48) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 824.28 (172.89) 740.04 (175.22) 
 Neutral Distal 839.20 (172.10) 753.05 (174.54) 
  Proximal 834.99 (197.25) 726.63 (151.73) 
Proximal Negative Distal 857.06 (179.15) 733.91 (151.94) 
(attentional disengagement 
trials) 
Proximal 861.56 (156.94) 
 
741.99 (158.85) 
 Neutral Distal 831.80 (179.33) 727.39(136.719) 
  Proximal 852.97 (167.62) 736.03 (163.06) 
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Table A3 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the high-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups for block one of trials 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 795.51 (94.36) 654.04 (83.84) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 729.99 (106.39) 645.42 (108.40)  
 Neutral Distal 783.62 (112.04) 658.37 (86.81) 
  Proximal 767.76 (95.05) 643.53 (104.24) 
Proximal Negative Distal 756.83 (124.60) 652.17 (108.39) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 784.69 (108.30) 678.97 (91.45) 
 
 Neutral Distal 717.69 (89.50) 674.93 (115.75) 
  Proximal 785.98 (145.19) 660.09 (98.46) 
 
Table B4 
Means and standard deviations of attentional bias index scores for the three load conditions 
for block one of trials 
 Load condition  Engagement bias Disengagement bias 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -32.01 (60.84) -20.21 (66.91) 
 Low load 25.80 (107.87) 16.68 (87.76) 
 High load 49.66 (92.51) 40.44 (160.04) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -15.49 (100.77) -17.88 (81.02) 
 Low load -41.34 (99.16) 0.56 (105.43) 
 High load -6.22 (69.05) -41.65 (69.21) 
 
 
 
